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COMMENTS
IN SPITE OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS, THE
DODD–FRANK ACT HAS CREATED AN
FCPA MONSTER
Heidi L. Hansberry*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 has the noble goal of
deterring corporations and individuals from engaging in corrupt dealings
with foreign officials. To achieve this goal, the FCPA outlaws the bribery
of foreign officials (the anti-bribery prong) and condemns deficient
accounting practices (the books and records prong).2 The FCPA empowers
both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to enforce these two prongs.3
The DOJ and SEC have been overwhelmingly successful in their
enforcement efforts, as measured by the price tags of the settlements they
have achieved. The top ten corporate FCPA settlements in the past three
years alone amount to over $3.1 billion,4 a figure that includes criminal
fines, civil disgorgement, and prejudgment interest collected by both
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., Yale
University, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Juliet Sorensen and Robert Silvers for
their assistance in developing the idea for this Comment. Additionally, I owe much gratitude
to Will Singer, Jessica Fricke, and Eric Westlund for their invaluable suggestions and edits.
1
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78m(a).
3
See The Lay Person’s Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery
Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/laypersons-guide.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter The Lay Person’s Guide].
4
J&J Joins New Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 4:43 PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/4/8/jj-joins-new-top-ten.html (citing the following
corporate fines: Siemens ($800 million), KBR/Halliburton ($579 million), BAE ($400
million), Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. ($365 million), Technip S.A. ($338 million), JGC
Corporation ($218.8 million), Daimler AG ($185 million), Alcatel-Lucent ($137 million),
Panalpina ($81.8 million), Johnson & Johnson ($70 million)).
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agencies.5 These figures make it clear that the FCPA has created a highstakes game for implicated corporations, issuers, and individuals.
A significant development for the FCPA occurred in July 2010, when
Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act).6 This act amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which contains the FCPA.7 Notably, the Dodd–
Frank Act added provisions that protect whistleblowers who report
Securities Exchange Act violations.
The provisions mandate that
whistleblowers receive a percentage of the fines resulting from government
convictions or settlements.8 Subject to certain requirements, whistleblowers
are entitled to 10%–30% of the total fines imposed on companies for
providing information that assists the government in its investigation of
Securities Exchange Act allegations.9
In addition to providing qualifying whistleblowers with a bounty, the
Dodd–Frank Act protects whistleblowers in two other respects. First, it
allows whistleblowers to remain anonymous up to the point of receiving
their financial awards.10
Second, the Dodd–Frank Act allows
whistleblowers to redeem their bounties unless they are convicted of a
crime related to the reported FCPA violations.11
The Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower bounties and enhanced
whistleblower protections have strengthened the power of the FCPA. A
10%–30% minimum payout means that the Dodd–Frank Act guarantees
qualifying whistleblowers multi-million dollar bounties, based on the top
figures in the last few years. This financial incentive for whistleblowers, in
addition to the benefit of anonymity and the policy to provide financial
awards to complicit, but non-convicted, whistleblowers, is dangerous. This
Comment will argue that with such a big carrot, anonymity, and a free pass
for complicit behavior that does not result in a conviction, whistleblowers
5

The FCPA’s Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (July 20, 2010, 8:28 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/7/20/the-fcpas-top-ten.html.
6
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act].
7
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).
8
Dodd–Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (Supp. IV 2011).
9
Id.
10
§ 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (“Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the Commission
and any officer or employee of the Commission shall not disclose any information, including
information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower, except in accordance with the provisions
of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, unless and until required to be disclosed to a
defendant or respondent in connection with a public proceeding instituted by the
Commission or any entity described in subparagraph (C).”).
11
§ 78u-6(c)(2)(B).
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are more likely to submit incomplete or frivolous claims or, in the worstcase scenario, engage in behavior that encourages or brings about FCPA
violations.
The Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower protections add to the burden on
corporations, in particular. Corporations are at an extreme disadvantage
because of the financial repercussions of fighting FCPA accusations, and a
cost–benefit analysis nearly always results in corporations settling claims
with the SEC or submitting to fines and monitoring imposed by the DOJ.12
Once FCPA charges are brought or an FCPA investigation is initiated,
corporations tend to settle or plead rather than litigate.13 There are several
reasons for this tendency. First, the FCPA provides for only two
affirmative defenses.14 Second, the FCPA imposes successor liability—
liability for acquired corporations’ FCPA violations, in a strict liability
manner—for acts occurring prior to the entity’s acquisition by the parent
company. Third, the government’s burden of proof has never been tested in
court with regard to companies accused of FCPA violations,15 so companies
are unable to benefit from any FCPA precedent. Thus, the “feds [have]
immense power . . . . [because] they don’t have to prove their legal theories
of bribery in court.”16
The whistleblower provisions will likely increase the number of FCPA

12

Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill’s Whistleblower Provisions and the FCPA,
FCPA PROFESSOR (July 20, 2010, 12:02 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/
2010/07/financial-reform-bills-whistleblower.html (“[A] settled SEC FCPA enforcement
action does not necessarily represent the triumph of the SEC’s legal position over the
company’s, but rather reflects a risk-based decision primarily grounded in issues other than
facts and the law. It is simply easier and more cost-efficient for a company to settle an SEC
FCPA enforcement (notwithstanding whatever dubious and untested legal theory it is based
on) than to participate in long, protracted litigation with its principal government
regulator.”); see also Richard L. Cassin, The Company Line, FCPA BLOG (July 29, 2010,
6:22 AM), http://fcpablog.com/blog/2010/7/29/the-company-line.html (“[Corporations are]
strictly liable under respondeat superior for crimes committed by employees in the scope of
their jobs. That’s why no company has fought against FCPA charges in court for more than
two decades.”).
13
See William McGrath, Corporate Defendant Lindsey Manufacturing Tried and
Convicted on FCPA Charges (Along with 3 Other Individuals), FED. SEC. L. BLOG (May 11,
2011), http://www.fedseclaw.com/2011/05/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1/corporatedefendant-lindsey-manufacturing-tried-and-convicted-on-fcpa-charges-along-with-3-otherindividuals (noting that only two companies, Harris Corporation and Lindsey Manufacturing,
have litigated FCPA cases through trial).
14
See infra Part II.A.
15
In contrast, individuals accused of FCPA violations have taken allegations to trial
rather than plead guilty. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 08-50343, 2009 WL
226163 at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2009); United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Jefferson, 623 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 2009).
16
Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Law Racket, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 70, 71.
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investigations and also lessen a defendant’s ability to combat the charges,
given the nature of complaints from anonymous whistleblowers.
Whistleblower anonymity may prevent a company from conducting a
thorough internal investigation of the alleged conduct or exploring a
whistleblower’s potential ulterior motives.
Thus, companies and
individuals may more frequently choose to settle or plead guilty to FCPA
charges, regardless of the legitimacy of the allegations, because of the
uncertainty resulting from anonymous accusations.
Corporations have much to lose by taking FCPA allegations to trial.
The mere fact that a corporation is under investigation by the government
has reliably damaging results on shareholder confidence and stock prices.17
One would imagine that litigation would only exacerbate this negative
economic effect, due to the increase in publicity at the trial phase. While
companies face such significant economic risk, they might never call the
bluff of the government, who may rely upon whistleblowers with frivolous
claims, albeit unknowingly. Corporations’ cost–benefit analyses, therefore,
lead them to abandon the idea of litigating FCPA allegations.18
With the added muscle that the Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower
provision provides, the FCPA has become a monster. This Comment
suggests ways to temper the FCPA in order to preserve its worthwhile goals
of punishing and deterring bribery of foreign officials while reducing the
chances of companies being unfairly punished and whistleblowers being
improperly incentivized and rewarded. These proposed changes to the
FCPA fall into two categories: the prevention of whistleblower abuse and
the strengthening of a corporation’s ability to defend itself. The specific
proposals include the following: (1) the addition of language that warns
whistleblowers about prosecution for the provision of false information, (2)
the elimination of the anonymity privilege, (3) a cap on the whistleblower’s
bounty, and (4) the creation of additional defenses.
Following this introduction, Part II of this Comment provides an
overview of the history and anatomy of the FCPA. Part III explains the
Dodd–Frank Act’s applicability to the FCPA. Part IV critiques the Dodd–
Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions in the context of the FCPA. Part V
outlines policy issues and proposals for amendments to the Dodd–Frank
Act and the FCPA. Part VI contains concluding remarks.
17
Patrick Conroy & Raymund Wong, The Wider Costs of FCPA Investigations, KROLL
GLOBAL FRAUD REPORT, Mar. 2009, at 12, available at http://www.docstoc.com/
docs/61261696/Global-Fraud-Report (noting that of thirty-one companies facing FCPA
allegations, nine had statistically significant declines in stock prices and that the “impact on
market capitalization of an FCPA-related announcement was far larger than the regulatory
settlement imposed”).
18
See Koehler, supra note 12.
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II. THE HISTORY AND ANATOMY OF THE FCPA
The FCPA was passed in 1977 as a reaction to a series of scandals.19
Data revealed that approximately 400 American companies admitted to
making corrupt or “questionable” payments to foreign officials, amounting
to over $300 million, in the 1970s.20 Theodore Sorensen described the
policy rationale underpinning the creation of the FCPA:
It is unethical for a corporation to pay bribes or kickbacks to foreign officials to
induce them to violate their duty—a practice subversive of sound government, sound
business and sound relations between the two, no matter how deeply entrenched it
may have become in the host country; a costly, wasteful interference with the free
competitive market system; and a cynical, shabby technique of getting business which
usually rewards the richest, most reckless and ruthless while passing on the cost to
those who can afford it least.21

In this climate, Congress enacted the FCPA in an attempt to “restore public
confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”22
In addition to serving important policy objectives, the FCPA filled a
significant gap in the law concerning bribery. Bribery within U.S. territory
is punishable by several different laws.23 Bribery of foreign officials
outside of the U.S. was formerly punishable only indirectly by tax and
securities law violations, specifically if companies (1) failed to report
payments to foreign government officials to the SEC, (2) deducted corrupt
payments as a business expense on a tax return, or (3) financed corrupt
payments with secret funds or phony entities.24 As noted by Sorensen in
1976, bribery of a foreign official was not illegal if it occurred outside U.S.
territory.25 Thus, Congress enacted the FCPA in order to directly
criminalize the act of bribery of a foreign official in foreign territory.26
The FCPA was groundbreaking for its time, as it was the first
international anti-bribery statute of its type and scope in the world.27 The
U.S. made efforts to spread its gospel as well, and it played a leading role in
creating the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
19

The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 1.
Id. (noting a DOJ report that summarized data compiled by the SEC).
21
Theodore C. Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54
FOREIGN AFF. 719, 724 (1976).
22
The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 2.
23
Id. at 1 (referencing the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006),
and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006), which permit federal prosecution for violations
of state commercial bribery laws).
24
Sorensen, supra note 21, at 724.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Robert C. Blume & J. Taylor McConkie, Navigating the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: The Increasing Cost of Overseas Bribery, 36 COLO. LAW. 91, 91 (2007).
20
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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, which was signed by thirty-four
countries in 1997.28
A. THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF THE FCPA

The FCPA is part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.29 Generally
speaking, the FCPA prohibits companies, including their employees and
agents, from engaging in corrupt conduct with foreign officials.30 The
FCPA applies to issuers, which include any U.S. or foreign company
registered with or required to file reports to the SEC,31 and “domestic
concerns.”32 The FCPA penalizes offering anything of value to a foreign
official in an attempt to influence that official or to secure an advantage in
obtaining or retaining business.33 The FCPA also targets the circumstances
that allow bribery to go undetected by imposing standards for book- and
recordkeeping and penalizing the failure to meet these standards.34
Two amendments to the FCPA mark its trend of becoming stricter and
wider in scope over time. In 1988, Congress raised the amount it could fine
both companies and individuals for FCPA violations.35 The 1988

28

The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 2.
FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494 (1977).
30
The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 1.
31
In the context of the anti-bribery prong of the FCPA, an “issuer” may be both an entity
that is registered with the SEC and an entity that is required to file reports to the SEC, as
well as the agents and corporate executives of such issuers. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
In the context of the books and records prong of the FCPA, an “issuer” is limited to entities
that issue securities registered with the SEC. § 78m(a).
32
§ 78dd-2; see also The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 3 (“A ‘domestic concern’
is any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States, or any
corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated
organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United
States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States, or a territory,
possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”).
33
§ 78dd-1(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities
registered pursuant to section 78l of this title or which is required to file reports under
section 78o(d) of this title, or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or
any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to (1) any foreign
official . . . (2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign
political office . . . .”).
34
§ 78m.
35
1977 Legislative History—House Report, Trade and Competitiveness Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., 916, 924 (July 7, 2009, 7:52 AM), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf [hereinafter 1977 Legislative History] (“The House bill
29

2012]

THE FCPA MONSTER

201

amendment also imposed liability for acts of third parties36 and expanded
the anti-bribery prong to include “securing any improper advantage.”37
Finally, the 1988 amendment expanded the term “foreign official” to
include members of public international organizations,38 enlarging an ambit
that already included anyone holding public office and the employees of a
state-owned or state-run business or entity.39
A second amendment in 1998 widened the scope of the FCPA to
include foreign nationals and businesses that committed an act in
furtherance of an FCPA violation in the U.S.40 The FCPA, therefore,
currently reaches foreign companies and foreign nationals, as long as they
have the prescribed nexus to the U.S.41 The 1998 amendment also clarified
that the FCPA applies to natural and legal persons, i.e., corporate entities,
who committed acts in furtherance of a bribe.42 Notably, however, foreign
officials themselves cannot be prosecuted under the FCPA.43
The 1988 amendment also tempered the FCPA, but this Comment
argues that it did not sufficiently dial down its strength. The amendment

amended both the FCPA and Section 32(c) of the Exchange Act to raise the maximum
criminal fine for a firm or domestic concern from $1 million under present law to $2 million,
and for individuals from $10,000 to $100,000 (maximum potential imprisonment for an
individual remains at 5 years). The House bill also created a new civil penalty of $10,000.”).
This bill is titled the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
tit. V, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006)).
36
1977 Legislative History, supra note 35, at 919.
37
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDLINE COMPARISON OF FCPA TO THE FINAL VERSION OF
S. 2375, at 4, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/s23751.pdf
[hereinafter REDLINE COMPARISON]; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)(iii), 78dd2(a)(1)(A)(iii).
38
See REDLINE COMPARISON, supra note 37; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)(iii);
78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(iii).
39
Obiamaka P. Madubuko, Emerging Markets: Risky Business or Golden
Opportunities?, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES COMPLIANCE ISSUES (2010), available at
http://www.mwe.com/info/pubs/Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_Act_Compliance_Issues.pdf.
40
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3; see also The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 4, at 2 (“The antibribery provisions of the FCPA make it unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign
issuers of securities, to make a corrupt payment to a foreign official for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. Since 1998,
they also apply to foreign firms and persons who take any act in furtherance of such a
corrupt payment while in the United States.”).
41
See The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 3 (“A foreign company or person is . . .
subject to the FCPA if it causes, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of the
corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the United States. There is, however, no
requirement that such act make use of the U.S. mails or other means or instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.”).
42
REDLINE COMPARISON, supra note 37, at 13.
43
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3.
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raised the mens rea requirement from recklessness to knowledge.44 This
stricter knowledge requirement, however, does not protect individuals who
consciously disregard the existence or likelihood of FCPA violations and
thus prohibits a “head-in-the-sand” defense.45 Furthermore, the amendment
did not require knowledge for a parent company, which is held vicariously
liable for acts committed by an acquired company, even if those acts
occurred prior to the acquisition.46
Second, Congress’s 1988 amendment created several affirmative
defenses. Liability was no longer imposed for “reasonable and bona fide
expenditure[s],”47 also known as “grease payments,” or for routine
governmental action.48 Congress also eliminated liability for payments that
were legal according to the written laws of the foreign official’s country. 49
This Comment takes the position that these defenses, while appropriate, are
insufficient.
B. ENFORCEMENT TRENDS

The FCPA was not heavily enforced during the first twenty years of its
existence and was considered a “legal sleeping dog.”50 Enforcement actions
by both the DOJ and the SEC have recently increased dramatically.51 A
representative example of the recent surge in enforcement is the FBI sting
resulting in sixteen indictments in January 2010.52 The indictments alleged
violations of the FCPA by twenty-two corporate executives and employees
trading military and law enforcement products.53 Undercover agents posing
44

1977 Legislative History, supra note 35, at 918–19.
Id.
46
Id. at 922–23; Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability
Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 965–66 (2009).
47
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
48
The Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 3, at 4–5.
49
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
50
Blume & McConkie, supra note 27, at 91 (quoting Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping
Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End Corruption in International Business, 17 J.
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 108, 108 (1998)).
51
Blume & McConkie, supra note 27, at 1, 5; see also Fact Sheet: The Department of
Justice Public Corruption Efforts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_ag_246.html (noting that the DOJ has
“substantially increased its focus on FCPA violations” since 2001); Alice S. Fisher, Assistant
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Remarks at the American Bar Association
National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
52
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of
Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme
(Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html.
53
Id.
45
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as foreign officials uncovered the scheme.54 In the press release related to
this FBI operation, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Criminal
Investigative Division stated that “[i]nvestigating corruption at all levels is
the number one priority of the FBI’s Criminal Division.”55 This example
makes it clear that the sleeping dog days of the FCPA are over.
Another indicator of heightened FCPA enforcement is an increase in
cooperation between U.S. and international authorities.
With its
international reach, FCPA enforcement often necessitates the assistance of
foreign law enforcement agencies. The New York Times described the
progression of FCPA enforcement from a “lonely battle” waged by the U.S.
independently to a cooperative, international team effort that is “growing
every day and getting better and better,” according to Assistant Attorney
General Lanny Breuer.56 In November 2011, Breuer announced the DOJ’s
plan to provide guidance on its enforcement of the FCPA’s bribery
provisions, but he warned that the DOJ has no intention of “supporting
reforms whose aim is to weaken the FCPA and make it a less effective tool
for fighting foreign bribery . . . . This is precisely the wrong moment in
history to weaken the FCPA.”57 The enforcement of FCPA violations
shows no sign of slowing, and this trend helps to explain the growing
concern of multinational corporations as well as their increasing
expenditures on consultants and lawyers to advise them on how to adapt to
this aggressive enforcement environment.58
III. THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE FCPA
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act, the FCPA did not have
a whistleblower protection provision.59 Other statutes, however, did have
such provisions.60
Congressional hearings reflect that inadequate
54

Id.
Id.
56
Diana B. Henriques, F.B.I. Snares Weapons Executives in Bribery Sting, N.Y. TIMES,
January 21, 2010, at A3.
57
Mike Scarcella, DOJ Plans New Guidance On Foreign Bribery Enforcement, BLT:
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/11/doj-plansnew-guidance-on-foreign-bribery-enforcement.html.
58
See Vardi, supra note 16 (“‘This is good business for law firms,’ says Joseph
Covington, who headed the Justice Department’s FCPA efforts in the 1980s and is now
codirector of white-collar defense at Jenner & Block. ‘This is good business for accounting
firms, it’s good business for consulting firms, the media—and Justice Department lawyers
who create the marketplace and then get [themselves] job[s].’”).
59
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006).
60
See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers,
and the Implications of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1029, 1063–64, 1068 (2004) (“[The Sarbanes–Oxley Act] provides federal statutory
55
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whistleblower protection in the context of misconduct by U.S. contractors
overseas was a topic of concern among members of Congress in 2009.61
Representative John Dingell stated that “there is an egregious lack of both
accountability and transparency” in reference to U.S. contractors doing
work overseas.62 Representative Earl Blumenauer also said that “our laws
have been inadequate to curb what became a free-for-all for contractors
overseas,” and he promoted measures that would “define and reign in
unacceptable and damaging contractor abuses.”63
Cue the Dodd–Frank Act, enacted on July 21, 2010, which amended
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include section 21(F), entitled
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.”64 The Dodd–Frank
Act defines a whistleblower as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of
the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.”65 The amendment describes the financial
payments that whistleblowers receive for “original information.”66 In
protection to whistleblowers who report fraud at publicly traded companies, provides
criminal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers, and requires publicly traded
companies to institute procedures for handling internal complaints . . . . In addition to its
application to whistleblowing about securities fraud and accounting violations, § 1107 also
criminalizes retaliation against an employee who reports any federal offense to law
enforcement.”); see also Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower
Program Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 459 (2010)
(“The False Claims Act promotes a ‘working partnership’ between the qui tam plaintiff and
the government by effectively deputizing private citizens to prosecute fraud against the
federal government as full participating parties in the litigation, whether or not the
government intervenes.”); id. at 455–70 (describing the Internal Revenue Code
enhancements to the whistleblower program for the Internal Revenue Service, which had
been authorized by statute since as early as 1867 to pay awards to whistleblowers).
61
E.g., 155 CONG. REC. E1721 (daily ed. July 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. Ken Calvert)
(“Last week, a letter signed by seven congressmen and women went to President Obama,
urging him to swift action on the issue of whistleblower protection for federal employees,
‘Whistleblowers are our nation’s best resource against fraud and abuse of the public trust,’
the letter says. ‘Legal victories for employees who have been retaliated against for blowing
the whistle are almost nonexistent. We encourage you to support congressional efforts to
reform the inadequate system of whistleblower protections, such as H.R. 1507.’”).
62
156 CONG. REC. 6704 (2010).
63
Id.
64
Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (Supp. IV 2011)).
65
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
66
§ 78u-6(b)(1); see also § 78u-6(a)(3) (“The term ‘original information’ means
information that—(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a
whistleblower; (B) is not known to the Commission from any other source, unless the
whistleblower is the original source of the information; and (C) is not exclusively derived
from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a governmental report,
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addition, the Dodd–Frank Act provides a robust confidentiality component,
preserving a whistleblower’s identity up until a financial reward is issued.67
Under the Dodd–Frank Act, an anonymous FCPA whistleblower can
communicate with government officials through an attorney prior to the
time of payment.68
The Dodd–Frank Act’s financial incentives for whistleblowers are
substantial. Whistleblowers receive 10%–30% of the financial penalties
imposed on a company.69 Compared to whistleblower provisions in other
statutes, this percentage is typical. The IRS Whistleblower Act and the
False Claims Act whistleblower provisions, for example, also give
whistleblowers 10%–30% of the total money recovered as a result of their
assistance.70 The IRS Whistleblower Act, the False Claims Act, and the
Dodd–Frank Act (to a more limited degree) also allow whistleblowers to
recover even if their “tips” are based on publicly available information.71
Additionally, all three acts theoretically reward whistleblowers who
planned or initiated the actions that led to the crime at issue, unless they
were convicted for involvement in the crime.72
The Dodd–Frank Act affords FCPA whistleblowers several more
notable advantages. First, FCPA whistleblowers are not required to pursue
a corporation’s internal administrative avenues for their complaints,
observations, or concerns—a policy that condones whistleblower reports to
federal law enforcement agencies as a first step.73 Second, the Dodd–Frank
Act allows whistleblowers to appeal their awards should they disagree with

hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the whistleblower is a source
of the information.”).
67
§ 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (“Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the Commission
and any officer or employee of the Commission shall not disclose any information, including
information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be
expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower, except in accordance with the provisions
of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, unless and until required to be disclosed to a
defendant or respondent in connection with a public proceeding instituted by the
Commission or any entity described in subparagraph (C).”).
68
§ 78u-6(d)(2).
69
§ 78u-6(b)(1); see also § 78u-6(a)(1) (limiting eligibility to actions against companies
that result in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million).
70
See Kwon, supra note 60, at 456–57.
71
Id. at 458; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
72
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (“No award under subsection (b) shall be made—(B)
to any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or
administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under
this section.”); Kwon, supra note 60, at 458 (“A qui tam plaintiff convicted of criminal
conduct arising from his or her role is not entitled to any award.”).
73
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3.
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the government’s appraisal of their assistance.74 Third, the Dodd–Frank
Act protects whistleblowers from retaliatory acts committed by any
employer, covering whistleblowers employed by a subsidiary company and
closing a loophole present in other statutes.75 Fourth, the Dodd–Frank Act
creates a private cause of action that allows whistleblowers to bring suit for
employer retaliation damages.76
Although the Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower provision is consistent
with other acts that protect whistleblowers, these statutory protections are
problematic in that they reward whistleblowers in ironic situations: when
they have been involved in the reported conduct and when they provide
publicly available information. The Dodd–Frank Act takes whistleblower
protection several significant steps further with its appeal and antiretaliation aspects. The next Part will explore policy reasons for the Dodd–
Frank Act’s robust whistleblower protections. This Comment will argue
that even considering these goals, the Dodd–Frank Act has gone too far.
IV. DODD–FRANK’S NOBLE GOALS BUT MISGUIDED LEGISLATION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF FCPA WHISTLEBLOWERS
A. POLICY RATIONALES IN FAVOR OF WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTIONS

Stronger whistleblower protections and incentives will likely cause an
increase in the reporting of FCPA violations. The SEC recently reported
receiving one to two “high value” tips per day, up from about a dozen per
year prior to the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Act.77 The SEC further
indicated that whistleblower tips were frequently submitted by attorneys
acting on behalf of whistleblowers and were “of good enough quality to
allow the agency to begin following up quickly.”78 Another agency, the
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), found that the
IRS whistleblower program increased the detection of and, consequently,
the number of punishments for tax violations.79 TIGTA also reported that
the program was more effective and less expensive than the Service’s own
74

§ 78u-6(f).
See § 78u-6(h)(1)(A); T. Marcus Funk, Getting What They Pay For: The FarReaching Impact Of the Dodd–Frank Act’s ‘Whistleblower Bounty’ Incentives on FCPA
Enforcement, 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 640, 640 (Sept. 10, 2010).
76
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i); Funk, supra note 75, at 641.
77
Dave Clarke, SEC Gets More Whistleblower Tips, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:27 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/us-sec-whistlebloweridUSTRE7135UA20110204.
78
Id.
79
Kwon, supra note 60, at 449 (discussing the TIGTA June 2006 audit report).
75

2012]

THE FCPA MONSTER

207

internal method of selecting tax returns for audit.80
Increased reporting will facilitate more enforcement.
More
enforcement will likely lead to more deterrence. Deterring the behavior
prohibited by the FCPA means advancing several congressional policy
goals. These goals, noted by Congress in its hearings leading up to the
enactment of the FCPA, are described in the following House of
Representatives report:
[The payment of bribes] erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market
system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to those companies too
inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in
honest salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In short, it
rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to
lower their standards or risk losing business. Bribery of foreign officials by some
American companies casts a shadow on all U.S. companies. The exposure of such
activity can damage a company’s image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation
of contracts, and result in the appropriation of valuable assets overseas . . . .
Corporate bribery also creates severe foreign policy problems for the United States.
The revelation of improper payments invariably tends to embarrass friendly
governments, lower the esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign
nations, and lend credence to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United
States that American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political processes
of their nations . . . . [A] strong antibribery statute would actually help U.S.
81
corporations resist corrupt demands.

The prevention of foreign bribery is critical to preserving the integrity and
success of American business and foreign relations. By facilitating reports
of FCPA violations, whistleblower protections are consistent with the goals
of the FCPA.
Increased assistance from whistleblowers, resulting from robust
whistleblower protection and incentives, also theoretically reduces the
government’s costs of detecting and proactively investigating violations of
the FCPA. Acting essentially as informants, whistleblowers provide inside
information that may otherwise be difficult or time-consuming for the
government to obtain. As volunteers, whistleblowers are perhaps more
likely to be cooperative, as compared to other types of informants, thus
enhancing the efficiency of FCPA investigations. Finally, whistleblowers
provide free labor, as they are paid from the spoils of successful FCPA
investigations. Since they are paid on commission, whistleblowers
constitute a less expensive means of investigating FCPA violations.
The financial incentives for whistleblowers may also aid in countering
social pressure to not report crime. A law review article posits that
whistleblowers face “extreme societal disapproval . . . . [N]ot only has the
80
81

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4–5 (1977).
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law been generally unsympathetic to whistleblowers, but so have coworkers and others outside the organization who do not support a decision
to report wrongdoing.”82 The article advocates for strong whistleblower
protection laws to combat the anti-whistleblower climate.83 Incentives to
overcome various social obstacles seem especially important in light of a
study on whistleblowers indicating that “82% experienced harassment after
blowing the whistle, 60% were fired, 17% lost their homes, and 10%
admitted to having attempted suicide.”84 The negative consequences
suffered by whistleblowers should not be ignored. The challenge lies in
creating provisions that will adequately protect whistleblowers while not
creating perverse incentives that will undercut important policy goals.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE DODD–FRANK ACT’S LEGISLATION

1. False Information
One of the Dodd–Frank Act’s policy goals is to facilitate the reporting
of truthful allegations to law enforcement. A significant problem of the
Dodd–Frank provision is that whistleblowers face no criminal
consequences for submitting false reports.
The only check on
whistleblowers is outlined in the section called “Provision of False
Information,” which states:
(i) PROVISION OF FALSE INFORMATION—A whistleblower shall not be entitled
to an award under this section if the whistleblower (1) knowingly and willfully makes
any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (2) uses any false
writing or document knowing the writing or document contains any false, fictitious, or
85
fraudulent statement or entry.

Aside from the deprivation of a financial award, the Dodd–Frank Act does
not specify any sort of punishment for the provision of false or fraudulent
information.
One critic of whistleblower legislation stated the following concern:
“Any time you incentivize rank-and-file workers with a lot of money,
rational actors are going to respond. You’re going to see an increase in

82

Cherry, supra note 60, at 1051–52.
Id. at 1052.
84
Id. at 1053 (quoting David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes?
Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 113 (1995)).
85
Dodd–Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(i) (Supp. IV 2011). Note that the Dodd–Frank
Act also included a similar amendment to the Commodities Exchange Act. In contrast to the
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, the amendment to the Commodities Exchange
Act states that a person who provides false information “shall be subject to prosecution
under section 1001 of title 18.” 7 U.S.C. § 26(m) (Supp. IV 2011).
83
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enforcement activity regardless of whether the action violates the law.”86
The SEC receives tips from various types of whistleblowers, including
employees within an accused corporation, competitors of an accused
corporation, counterparties of the accused corporation, and jilted spouses of
wrongdoers.87 These different types of whistleblowers may have different
motives for coming forward, including illegitimate or ulterior motives.
The danger is that such illegitimate motives may be so strong and the
protections of the Dodd–Frank Act so robust as to enable false claims. The
dangers of false claims include not only false convictions, but also the
wasted time spent sifting through meritless claims. Thus, an influx of
“tips” from overeager or fraudulent whistleblowers could launch a series of
fishing expeditions that would, at best, reduce the efficiency of the
oversight system and, at worst, unjustly put innocent corporations in
compromised positions.88
2. Respondeat Superior
Whistleblowing also exacerbates the unfairness of respondeat superior
liability for criminal acts. Under the respondeat superior principle, the
FCPA holds a company vicariously and strictly liable for the actions of its
employees, subsidiaries, and subsidiary’s employees.89 Punishing a
corporate entity, disconnected as the majority of its directors and employees
may be from any of the alleged misconduct, seems inherently unfair,
especially when fines are so colossal.
This form of liability is also problematic because of the reach of the
FCPA’s respondeat superior policy, which extends to subsidiary entities
and the past acts of acquired companies, i.e., before the company was

86
Samuel Rubenfeld, Expanded Whistleblower Program Could Aid FCPA Enforcement,
DOW JONES NEWS (Apr. 12, 2010, 4:39 PM), http://www.advfn.com/news_ExpandedWhistleblower-Program-Could-Aid-FCPA-Enforcement_42346346.html; see also Koehler,
supra note 12 (“Among other law firms with an FCPA practice or FCPA practitioners
writing about the subject, Morgan Lewis stated that the ‘new law is likely to greatly increase
the number of FCPA matters under government investigation’; Fried Frank predicted that the
‘new whistleblower program may end up playing a key role in identifying and prosecuting
violations of the FCPA’; and Richard Cassin on the FCPA Blog guessed that the ‘bounty
program will result in more FCPA cases against corporations.’”) (citations omitted).
87
Clarke, supra note 77.
88
Shruti Shah & Robert N. Walton, The SEC’s Tricky Balancing Act, FCPA BLOG (Nov.
8, 2010, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/11/8/the-secs-tricky-balancingact.html.
89
See JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME 17 (2009) (“[A]
corporation is liable for criminal acts of its employees and agents done within the scope of
their employment with intent to benefit the corporation even without proof that the act was
expressly authorized or approved by the corporation.”).
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actually acquired by the parent company.90 Thus, a company can be held
responsible for acts of others over which it never exerted any control
because it had no authority to do so. Because strict liability is imposed,
companies are handicapped when facing suits or prosecutions based on a
crime committed by their employee or subsidiary.91
Strict, vicarious, criminal liability for the act of a rogue employee, a
distant subsidiary, or a recently acquired company violates basic notions of
justice. This policy seems especially unfair given that the government has
no burden to prove that a company had actual knowledge of or actively
encouraged the culpable behavior.92
A primary concern with liability imposed via respondeat superior is
that companies will be disincentivized to create strong compliance
programs “for fear that the return on such an investment will be only to
expose the company to increased liability.”93 The more extensive a
corporation’s compliance program, the more successful it will be in
detecting prohibited conduct. Greater success means greater exposure
because the corporation will be obligated to report its discoveries to the
government and will be held liable for the uncovered crimes of its
employees via respondeat superior.
Thus, the FCPA actually
disincentivizes corporations from implementing effective compliance
programs.
3. Complicit Behavior
Another troubling aspect of the Dodd–Frank Act is that short of
90

See ROBERT TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 100 (2010)
(“A company contemplating an acquisition or merger should conduct sufficient due
diligence to assure itself that the target’s employees or agents have not engaged in and/or do
not intend to make improper payments to government officials in the performance of a
company business.”).
91
Thomas R. Fox, Proposed Reforms to the FCPA: The Compliance Defense and
Respondeat Superior, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 2, 2010, 8:08 P.M.),
http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2010/11/02/proposed-reforms-to-the-fcpa-the-compliancedefense-and-respondeat-superior/.
92
See Justice for Corporate Defendants?, FCPA BLOG (June 10, 2008, 3:28 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/6/10/justice-for-corporate-defendants.html
(“[R]espondeat superior [is] the legal doctrine by which companies are vicariously liable for
crimes committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment—that is,
within their actual or apparent authority and on behalf of the corporation. It has left
companies completely defenseless in the face of criminal charges under the FCPA. Once an
employee admits to an FCPA violation or is found guilty, the company is automatically
guilty too.”).
93
ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
13–14 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/40239287/Chamber.
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receiving criminal convictions, whistleblowers complicit in the crimes they
report are not precluded from obtaining bounties. Under the Dodd–Frank
Act, financial awards are not provided “to any whistleblower who is
convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative
action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under
this section.”94 The Dodd–Frank Act, therefore, draws a distinction
between a cooperating informant who is convicted of a crime and a
whistleblower. One could imagine a situation, however, where a
whistleblower is complicit in or encourages the FCPA violation. Yet if no
charges are brought against such whistleblowers or if those charges do not
result in convictions, then whistleblowers would still receive financial
awards, in spite of the role they played. Thus, the Dodd–Frank Act
arguably over-incentivizes whistleblowers by overlooking contributory
conduct when doling out financial awards. The danger, therefore, is that the
Dodd–Frank Act will produce the behavior that it seeks to prevent.
4. Circumvention of Internal Protocols
Additionally, the Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower provision might
encourage whistleblowers to intentionally ignore or circumvent a
company’s own methods for handling misconduct. One critic notes the
possibility that whistleblowers might “bypass a company’s existing
compliance procedures,” which could “undermine good corporate
compliance programs.”95 Why would whistleblowers report tips to their
company if they could be paid by the government for reporting them
instead? Since whistleblowers may remain anonymous and are protected
from employer retaliation, a financially motivated employee would
rationally choose to notify law enforcement authorities. The inevitable
result in this scenario is that internal compliance programs will become
futile, defeating the ultimate purpose of the FCPA, which is to enhance a
corporation’s internal controls in order to detect bribery early, address
issues sooner, and prevent FCPA violations in the first place.
5. Opportunism
An additional concern is that opportunistic whistleblowers might be
able to make educated guesses as to the existence of FCPA violations with
only limited, indirect knowledge of potential or actual allegations. The
Dodd–Frank whistleblower provision requires “original information,”
which it defines as deriving from a whistleblower’s independent knowledge
or analysis, limited only by the requirement that such information was not
94
95

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011).
Shah & Walton, supra note 88.
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obtained from a court hearing, government report, audit, or investigation.96
This standard is vague and overbroad. Furthermore, the financial incentives
for a whistleblower to engage in independent analyses encourage
individuals to proactively accuse companies without any direct knowledge.
There are two possible outcomes following allegations lodged by
opportunistic whistleblowers who do not possess any concrete evidence but
may nevertheless present enough information to meet the minimal
requirements of “original information.” First, such allegations could lead to
a coincidental discovery of FCPA violations. If one believes that the end
justifies the means, then this result is a desirable one. However, ought the
whistleblower to receive a 10%–30% payment for making an educated
guess? If the opportunistic “whistleblower” is rewarded in this type of
situation without actually contributing (or risking) anything, then we would
potentially encourage a movement of citizens to be overly meddlesome in
business matters. Encouraging inexperienced vigilantes to investigate
corporations could also have implications for evidence preservation and
admissibility. The second likely result of a baseless accusation by a
supposed whistleblower is that such allegations could launch fishing
expeditions. In this scenario, the government’s time and limited resources
will have been wasted.
Another possible whistleblower claim is one where a whistleblower
gives the government “tip of the iceberg” information. Whistleblowers who
lead law enforcement to greater-than-anticipated FCPA violations would
qualify for a large award without having “earned it” by providing
commensurate assistance or information.97 It seems excessively generous
to reward a person with a percentage of the ultimate penalty that the
government obtains,98 rather than one that is proportionate to the utility of
96

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3).
It is important to note that the award paid to a whistleblower is, to an extent,
discretionary. The government has the ability to choose what percentage, within the
mandated range of 10%–30%, of a guilty company’s penalty will go to a whistleblower. The
government is instructed to take into account several criteria, as listed in the Dodd–Frank
Act:
97

(B) CRITERIA.—In determining the amount of an award made under subsection (b), the
Commission—(i) shall take into consideration—(I) the significance of the information provided
by the whistleblower to the success of the covered judicial or administrative action; (II) the
degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative of the
whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action; (III) the programmatic interest of
the Commission in deterring violations of the securities laws by making awards to
whistleblowers who provide information that lead to the successful enforcement of such laws;
and (IV) such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or regulation;
And (ii) shall not take into consideration the balance of the Fund.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B).
98
Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Will Whistle-Blowing Be Millions Well Spent?,
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the information provided.
Disproportionately large awards seem
unreasonable and could encourage overzealous behavior.
V. POLICY ISSUES AND PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. POLICY REPERCUSSIONS OF EXCESSIVELY STRONG
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS

As whistleblower protections will likely increase the number of
reported FCPA violations, it is important to address the negative policy
repercussions of over-enforcing the FCPA. Fears concerning the overenforcement of the FCPA include the discouragement of international
business and investment and a decreased competitive advantage for the
U.S.99 This fear is rational in light of successor liability for FCPA
violations. Successor liability is the principle that corporations acquiring
other entities inherit that entity’s liabilities.100 In this context, FCPA
violations and therefore FCPA liability can be transferred to otherwise
innocent parent companies in the process of business mergers and
acquisitions.101 This form of liability has the potential to stifle business
growth.
Several companies have fallen victim to the successor liability hook. 102
For example, Alliance One, which merged with Dimon Incorporated, was
held liable for the actions of Dimon’s foreign subsidiaries.103 Alliance One
was required to engage a compliance monitor for three years as part of a
mandatory compliance program.104 In a related civil suit, Alliance One’s
settlement with the SEC included a disgorgement of $10 million.105
FORBES.COM (Sept. 15, 2010, 1:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/09/15/whistleblowers-sec-opinions-columnists-perlis-chais.html.
99
See D. Michael Crites & Mark A. Carter, Why the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is
Hurting Our Businesses and Needs to Be Reformed, NAT’L L. REV. (May 15, 2011),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/why-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-hurting-ourbusinesses-and-needs-to-be-reformed (“The real effect of DOJ’s aggressive enforcement is
that it is stifling American companies from doing business abroad and here at home.
Companies themselves have to bear the burden of conducting extensive internal
investigations if faced with FCPA charges. Many businesses would rather end operations
with foreign countries than risk expansive DOJ investigations and spend resources to fight
FCPA charges.”).
100
See Lindsey, supra note 46 (citing United States v. Alamo Bank of Tex., 880 F.2d
828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989)).
101
Id.
102
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 93, at 17 (describing the fate of two companies,
Alliance One and Snamprogetti).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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The DOJ has emphasized that when a company acquires another
company, it must conduct extensive due diligence and disclose any possible
FCPA violations to the DOJ to avoid successor liability.106 Thus,
companies will be required to finance extensive internal audits and
investigations to prevent FCPA charges, which is likely to present a
significant expense. This policy has handicapped corporations considering
mergers and acquisitions:
The uncertainty about how much due diligence is sufficient, coupled with the threat of
successor liability even if thorough due diligence is undertaken, have in recent years
had a significant chilling effect on mergers and acquisitions. For example, Lockheed
Martin terminated its acquisition of Titan Corporation when it learned about certain
bribes paid by Titan’s African subsidiary that were uncovered during pre-closing due
diligence; Lockheed Martin was simply unwilling to take on the risk of FCPA
107
successor liability for those bribes.

The FCPA-compliance costs of business mergers and acquisitions—
whether they are expressed in terms of due diligence to detect liability or
fines resulting from liability—threaten to have serious repercussions for
U.S. business growth.
B. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE DODD–FRANK ACT WHISTLEBLOWER
PROVISION

This Comment proposes several amendments to the Dodd–Frank Act
that would prevent or limit whistleblower abuse. First, the Dodd–Frank Act
amendments to the FCPA should include a notice identical to the one found
in the Dodd–Frank Act amendments to the Commodities Exchange Act.108
The Commodities Exchange Act amendment admonishes whistleblowers
who provide false or fraudulent information that they will not only be
disqualified from receiving a financial award, but also “shall be subject to
prosecution under section 1001 of title 18.”109 A similar warning in the
whistleblower provision of the Dodd–Frank Act may deter those with
malicious intent who intend to fabricate evidence against corporations in
order to reap a reward. With nothing to lose and millions of dollars to gain,
whistleblowers are incentivized to submit false claims, but a warning could
decrease that incentive.
Second, Congress should eliminate the anonymity guarantee for
whistleblowers.
The ability to remain anonymous likely enables
whistleblowers who lodge false, fraudulent, or speculative claims because
they are penalized by neither the government nor the company that they
106
107
108
109

See Lindsey supra note 46, at 981–85.
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 93, at 15.
7 U.S.C. § 26(m) (Supp. IV 2011).
Id.
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accuse for making frivolous allegations.
For the same reasons,
whistleblowers may be more likely to engage in complicit behavior that
brings about violations when their identities are kept confidential.
Eliminating the anonymity privilege would likely reduce the number of
meritless or otherwise undesirable claims.
Third, a whistleblower’s financial award could be capped or, at the
very least, made directly proportionate to the calculated damages resulting
from the particular information provided.
In other words, the
whistleblower’s financial reward could be scaled down to include a
percentage of the penalty that would have resulted from the whistleblower’s
tips alone. This approach would substitute for the existing policy that
provides whistleblowers with a percentage of the gross penalty, which takes
into account all of the misconduct, including what the government was able
to discover later in the investigation above and beyond the information
provided by the whistleblower. The average whistleblower reward,
therefore, would be more modest, but not likely so small as to negate the
financial incentive altogether.
This discussion of proportionality and caps raises the question of
whether there is a need for a financial incentive at all. In commenting on
the Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower provisions,110 Geoffrey Rapp clarifies
the argument in favor of providing bounties to whistleblowers:
Merely protecting whistleblowers should not be the only goal. Rather, the goal should
be to optimize the quantity and quality of information that whistleblowers bring to
light about ongoing corporate malfeasance, and to do so in a way that makes early
111
intervention by public and private enforcement authorities feasible and effective.

Thus, there are several important reasons to retain a financial incentive for
whistleblowers. The whistleblower’s responsiveness to follow-up questions
may be quicker, and the quality of the information may be better. Rapp is
also a proponent of big-carrot bounties, where whistleblowers are
guaranteed a minimum amount of recovery and where there is judicial
review of such granted awards.112 Rapp highlights the argument that “[a]n
informer would have little incentive to give original information upon
occasions at considerable personal risk to officers of the United States if his
compensation rested in the absolute discretion, almost, one might say, in the

110

Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes–Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92
(2007) (describing the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as “[Congress’s] uniform, national, antiretaliation provision to protect whistleblowers who exposed their employers’ financial and
accounting fraud”).
111
Id. at 116.
112
Id. at 117.
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whim, of an executive officer.”113
The big-carrot system of the FCPA, however, is based upon
assumptions that the quality, speed, and volume of tips correlate with the
amount of the resulting financial reward. Financial awards could just as
likely provoke claims that are vague, tangential, or otherwise unfounded
from people who are solely motivated by money. A study summarized by
Rapp, however, reveals regret among 33% of past whistleblowers, who
reported that they would not blow the whistle again because “it wasn’t
worth it.”114 Is this a problem that more money can fix? Or are there
potentially other reasons for whistleblowers’ regret that money cannot
solve? Further research is warranted to determine what and how much,
exactly, motivates good-faith whistleblowers.
Another weakness in Rapp’s argument for big-carrot bounties is the
fact that a whistleblower may be incapable of properly estimating the
bounty at the stage of coming forward with the first tip. It is difficult to
argue that there is a threshold over which whistleblowers will be financially
incentivized when whistleblowers are, practically speaking, not able to
foresee how the government will calculate damages and, consequently, their
reward. A reward with a cap, or one that is scaled back and directly tied to
the whistleblower-provided information, is more appropriate.
C. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE FCPA

1. The Problem: Companies Are Paralyzed in Response to FCPA Charges
A significant problem with the Dodd–Frank Act’s enhancement of the
FCPA whistleblower protections is that it makes it even harder for
corporations to combat FCPA allegations. Corporations often decide that
FCPA allegations are not worth fighting in court, in part because publicity
related to FCPA allegations has a significant negative impact on stock
prices.115 Additionally, given that the government’s ability to prove various
components of an FCPA charge has not frequently been tested in court,
precedent cannot be relied upon to inform strategy or predict outcomes.116
Several internet blogs are especially vocal about this problem. One blog
writer elaborated upon this argument:
Against the backdrop of little substantive FCPA case law, the FCPA is enforced based
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largely on government enforcement agency interpretations that have never been
accepted by a court . . . . [N]otwithstanding the dubious and untested legal theories
they are based on, [FCPA allegations that reasonable minds would question] are
routinely settled by companies via a resolution vehicle that does not require the
company to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations. Quite simply, a settled SEC FCPA
enforcement action does not necessarily represent the triumph of the SEC’s legal
position over the company’s, but rather reflects a risk-based decision primarily
grounded in issues other than facts and the law. It is simply easier and more cost117
efficient for a company to settle . . . .

Companies, therefore, are significantly disadvantaged because they face the
possibility of FCPA charges without the benefit of sufficient guidance or
precedent.
In 1976, one year prior to the enactment of the FCPA, Theodore
Sorensen wrote that the issue of international bribery was far more complex
than it appears and shed light on the rationale behind affirmative
defenses.118 First, he argued that some payments to foreign officials, absent
a quid pro quo and if of “an amount appropriate under the circumstances, to
a qualified and responsible professional for his performance of legitimate
and necessary services, may well be perfectly justifiable.”119 He further
drew a distinction between companies that voluntarily seek an unlawful
benefit and companies that, under duress or coercion, seek something to
which they are lawfully entitled.120 Prior to the enactment of the FCPA,
courts recognized that companies forced to pay off a foreign official to save
their businesses from dissolution were not guilty of bribery.121
Sorensen argued that “not even all payments made to foreign officials
should be judged alike.”122 He points out, for example, that not all large
payments to foreign officials are necessarily unethical: “The payment of a
large commission to a[] [foreign official] agent is no more clear evidence of
illegality than is payment of a large commission to an American real estate
agent on the sale of an expensive home.”123 Sorensen further lists examples
of situations where the determination of the existence of bribery is far from
simple because the public and private sectors can often be intertwined.124
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Disentangling the two in order to show bad motives and abuse can, in
certain situations, be difficult.125
This sympathetic perspective on bribery in the pre-FCPA era was not,
however, imported into the statute of the FCPA. The two affirmative
defenses included in the statute, the written laws defense and the reasonable
and bona fide expenditures defense,126 are insufficient and are themselves
problematic. First, these two defenses leave a significant gap, as they do
not cover the scenarios of duress, coercion, or extortion by a foreign
official. Second, the written laws defense is too narrow, as it fails to
include cultural practices and traditional methods of conducting business,
which are not typically codified as law. Regarding the reasonable and bona
fide expenditures defense, the DOJ has provided only the following limited
clarification for what constitutes a bona fide payment: “Personal gifts
masquerading as business expenditures will not qualify for this defense.
Rather, the defense covers payments such as travel and lodging expenses, as
well as small samples of the company’s products.”127 The vagueness of this
defense creates a gray area that could be exploited by the government and is
difficult to defend against. The government should instead provide a
detailed definition and an exhaustive list of what constitutes reasonable and
bona fide payments.
2. The Solution: Additional Defenses to FCPA Liability
In order to assist those accused of FCPA violations in defending
themselves, this Comment proposes additional defenses. These defenses
ought to be formally recognized in the text of the FCPA, alongside the
existing two affirmative defenses. Such codification, as well as guidance
for the elements required to satisfy each defense, would signify the
government’s acceptance of their legitimacy and therefore encourage
defendants to raise them. Furthermore, when proving a defense, the
defendant’s burden is typically a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.128 This lower standard
could provide an advantage to defendants or at least encourage them to
litigate. Additional defenses, in showing that FCPA charges are rebuttable,
may alleviate corporate anxiety concerning FCPA liability in the realm of
international business expansion and mergers and acquisitions.
The first proposed defense is a compliance defense, which would
allow a company to show evidence of sufficient due diligence that was,
125
126
127
128
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15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c), 78dd-2(c) (2006).
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through no fault of company, unsuccessful in the detection of FCPA
violations.129 This defense would allow a company to combat successor
liability because it would not be penalized for the failure to disclose
historical criminal acts of a company with which it merged or that it
acquired if it took reasonable steps to uncover it.130 Significant steps taken
in an attempt to comply with the FCPA ought to be rewarded.
A second proposal is for a lack of knowledge defense for FCPA
violations imposed via respondeat superior and successor liability.131
These forms of liability violate the FCPA’s own knowledge requirement in
the plain language of the statute.132 The culpability of rogue employees
acting on their own, engaging in conduct neither encouraged nor approved
by the leadership of a corporation, should not be imputed to the company as
a whole in the form of multi-million dollar fines. The absence of a joint
enterprise reflects a lack of knowledge on behalf of the company. With its
use of respondeat superior, the FCPA unfairly imposes strict liability on a
company for behavior that it neither condoned nor knew about.133 Lack of
knowledge, therefore, should either serve as a complete defense or at least
as a mitigating factor in scaling back the fines imposed on companies
facing liability for the actions of a single employee.
The FCPA’s legislative history does not indicate a rejection of a
knowledge requirement for successor liability:
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that the statute was intended to allow a
parent corporation to be charged with criminal violations of the anti-bribery
provisions by another company, even a subsidiary, if it had no knowledge of improper
payments. At most, the drafters indicated that if a parent company’s ignorance of the
actions of a foreign subsidiary was a result of conscious avoidance, or ‘looking the
other way,’ that such parent could be in violation of section 102 requiring companies
134
to devise and maintain adequate accounting controls.

The knowledge requirement is justified in the context of successor liability
because it would prevent the punishment of companies that are far removed
from the criminal conduct, which may have occurred prior to any
association with the company they acquired. A knowledge requirement
seems especially appropriate if the FCPA violations were committed by a
single individual who represents only a small percentage of the company’s
personnel. Imputing liability from an individual actor to an entire company
and then to a parent company goes too far.
129
130
131
132
133
134
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A third proposal is for a duress defense for situations where
extortion135 or other forms of coercion occur. A bribe, by definition,
involves two parties: the offeror of the bribe and the recipient of the bribe.
Excluding situations where one of these two parties is an undercover agent,
both parties share the culpability for the commission of the crime if the
bribe is actualized. The question, therefore, is to what extent the recipient’s
conduct mitigates the offeror’s culpability.
Some might argue that even in cases where a recipient extorted a bribe,
the two crimes, extortion and bribery, ought to be viewed separately. In
this sense, the crime of extortion would not lessen the crime of bribery, the
rationale being that the bribery itself is no less reprehensible under any
conditions. Professor James Lindgren takes this approach and described the
need for a clear message about the wrongness of the behavior, regardless of
the presence of extortion:
Unless a legislature clearly indicates otherwise, there is no reason to let off a briber
just because he was also a victim of extortion. If we were to let the briber off, he
could continue to cheat the public and other bidders, safe in the knowledge that the
136
official was corrupt enough to refuse him a fair chance without a payoff.

This argument does not address the possibility for the offeror to receive a
reduction in sentence. Such a reduction would preserve the deterrent effect
of being punished, while adjusting for circumstances in which another
person shares the blame.
One can imagine certain cultural circumstances that create scenarios
where well-intentioned actors are coerced to engage in bribery because of
threats by corrupt officials. Evidence of this sort of influence ought to
either fully or partially exonerate those facing liability. Thus, there should
be gradations of culpability built into the statute that allow for reductions in
jail time and fines when the bribe-takers have significantly contributed to
the commission of the crime.
This Comment proposes two final defenses for inclusion in the FCPA:

135
“The act or practice of obtaining something or compelling some action by illegal
means, as by force or coercion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 664 (9th ed. 2009).

The dividing line between bribery and extortion is shadowy. If one other than the officer
corruptly takes the initiative and offers what he knows is not an authorized fee, it is bribery and
not extortion. On the other hand, if the officer corruptly makes an unlawful demand which is
paid by one who does not realize it is not the fee authorized for the service rendered, it is
extortion and not bribery. In theory it would seem possible for an officer to extort a bribe under
such circumstances that he would be guilty of either offense whereas the outraged citizen would
be excused.

ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 538–39 (3d ed. 1982).
136
James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the
Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 826 (1988).
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the act of state doctrine and the public authority defense. These are
defenses for individuals, but they could indirectly benefit corporate entities
that would be held responsible for their employees’ actions per respondeat
superior. Both defenses are likely to apply to the context of FCPA
violations, as evidenced by United States v. Giffen. James Giffen, an
American businessman, unsuccessfully invoked both the act of state
doctrine and the public authority defense.137 Giffen was charged with
making corrupt payments to Kazakh officials.138 The government alleged
that these payments were intended to secure and retain business for the
defendant’s New York-based corporation in violation of the FCPA.139
The Kazakh government hired Giffen’s corporation as a consultant on
the government’s sale of its oil and gas reserves.140 Later, the Kazakh
government named Giffen a counselor to the president, a “semi-official title
that enabled Giffen to effect numerous oil and gas transactions.”141 Kazakh
officials further designated Giffen as a representative, consultant, and agent
at various times.142 The Kazakh government paid Giffen’s company almost
$67 million in fees.143 The government alleged that Giffen paid Kazakh
officials $78 million for their personal benefit in order to influence the
officials to continue business with Giffen’s corporation.144
Giffen argued that the act of state doctrine warranted the dismissal of
the counts against him.145 The act of state doctrine prevents U.S. courts
from “inquiring into the validity of the Public acts a recognized foreign
sovereign power committed within its own territory.”146 Giffen argued that
his actions, including the payments, were done in his capacity as an agent of
the Kazakh government and that he was authorized to create and maintain
bank accounts and to receive funds on behalf of the Kazakh government.147
Giffen argued that because he was an official of Kazakhstan, his acts
qualify as public acts of a foreign sovereign nation and are, therefore,
beyond the reach of U.S. courts, which are precluded from assessing the
legality or validity of such official acts.148
137
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The court held that the act of state doctrine did not apply because the
defendant’s secret payments to the Kazakh officials did not qualify as
official acts insofar as they were not required for the performance of his
purported official duties.149 Further, the payments in question occurred
outside of the territory of Kazakhstan, in both Switzerland and the U.S., and
the doctrine protects only those acts of a foreign sovereign that occur in its
territory.150 Thus, the Giffen court held that the act of state doctrine did not
bar Giffen’s prosecution and denied his motion to dismiss.151
Even though the court rejected Giffen’s act of state doctrine argument,
the case is instructive because it reveals scenarios where the act of state
defense strategy could be employed. Giffen might have been successful if
the payments in question were required of him in his role as a foreign
official and if he had made the payments in Kazakhstan. By precluding a
U.S. court’s review of the acts, the act of state doctrine would prevent
FCPA liability. Theoretically, the act of state doctrine could not only shield
an individual from FCPA liability, but also an affiliated company on the
hook via respondeat superior or successor liability. And while it is similar
to the written law’s affirmative defense, the act of state defense could afford
more coverage because it could potentially include traditions and customs
that are often not part of the black letter law of a country.
Giffen also pursued the public authority defense.152 The public
authority defense is a common law defense153 that involves proving that a
defendant committed an illegal act pursuant to the instruction or permission
of a legitimate government entity or official, i.e., a public authority.154 The
defendant must prove an objectively reasonable belief that the entity or
official had actual authority to permit the illegal act.155 Further, the defense
is limited to situations where the government official did in fact possess the
authority to authorize the defendant’s actions.156
Procedural requirements for this defense are codified in Rule 12.3 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 12.3 limits the public
authority defense to acts committed on behalf of a law enforcement agency
or federal intelligence agency.157 A defendant’s speculation that the public
149
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authority knew about the criminal acts and simply ignored them does not
rise to the level necessary for the public authority defense to apply.158
A second version of the public authority defense is called entrapment
by estoppel.159 This defense does not require that the defendant received
actual authorization, i.e., authorization that the government official is
legally permitted to give.160 Rather, this defense eliminates liability when
the government induces a defendant to commit illegal actions and leads the
defendant “to rely reasonably on his belief that his actions would be lawful
by reason of the government’s seeming authorization.”161
In dicta, the Second Circuit rejected Giffen’s usage of both versions of
the public authority defense.162 The court acknowledged Giffen’s claim that
he made numerous disclosures of his conduct to the U.S. government and
that the government asked him to report information about the President of
Kazakhstan.163 Giffen never told the government, however, that he
intended to commit the actions that the government charged him with,
namely bribery and fraud.164 Thus the government’s requests of him “did
not constitute authorization to commit the crimes charged.”165 Regarding
entrapment by estoppel, the court stated that “government officials neither
induced him to commit these crimes nor led him to an objectively
reasonable belief that he had received authorization.”166
Though the act of state doctrine defense and the public authority
defense were not effective for Giffen, one can imagine a set of facts that
would yield success. These defenses, therefore, should be included as
affirmative defenses in the FCPA.
3. Sentencing and Mitigation
If the above-noted defenses are found to be categorically
objectionable, all of the above factors should, at the very least, allow for
gradations of punishment in the mitigation phase of criminal trials or a
reduction in the fines assessed in civil proceedings. Discounts in sentences
identifying the government agency, the government official who authorized the act, and the
relevant time period of the government-authorized actions. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 2055 (1997).
158
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or fines are appropriate because business relations are complex, especially
in situations of trade between different nations with governments that are
involved in industry to varying extents. As Sorensen stated, “reasonable
men and even angels will differ on the answers” to complicated ethical
dilemmas that the FCPA presents.167
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for bribery, however, provide for
no gradations of punishment based on the above-listed factors. Indeed, with
respect to duress, they are consistent with Lindgren’s position and do not
allow for downward departures:
Ordinarily coercion will be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it
involves a threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property or similar injury
resulting from the unlawful action of a third party or from a natural emergency.
Notwithstanding this policy statement, personal financial difficulties and economic
168
pressures upon a trade or business do not warrant a downward departure.

The Sentencing Guidelines for FCPA convictions also do not explicitly
include mitigating factors concerning extortion or duress in the calculation
of jail time or financial penalties.169
A recent case provides support for granting departures for mitigating
factors in the context of the FCPA. In United States v. Bradstreet, the
defendant was convicted of an FCPA violation.170 The circuit court
discussed the fact that, in general, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines “place
essentially no limit on the number of potential factors that may warrant a
departure.”171 Quoting comments from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
the court further noted that “[w]hen a court finds an atypical case, one to
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct
significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a
departure is warranted.”172 The court of appeals in Bradstreet affirmed the
downward departure granted by the district court on the basis of the
defendant’s post-sentence rehabilitative efforts.173 This case indicates that
there is some degree of flexibility in granting downward departures for
FCPA convicts. However, preliminary research reflects that downward
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departures for FCPA violations are extremely difficult to obtain.174
VI. CONCLUSION
The clear trend of the anti-bribery movement is that legislation is
expanding—in scope, force, and to other jurisdictions throughout the
world.175 Although the FCPA sends a laudable message to U.S. companies
and the world, it has nevertheless exceeded its bounds, especially with the
whistleblower provisions added by the Dodd–Frank Act. This Comment
has proposed changes that will curb abuses of opportunistic or fraudulent
whistleblowers by arguing for the elimination of whistleblower anonymity
and a cap on bounties. Further, this Comment has argued that the FCPA
should be tempered by the addition of defenses or mitigating factors, which
take into account gradations of culpability.
This Comment and its recommendations are especially relevant given
the recently established Whistleblower Office in the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement.176 This office has been tasked with the promulgation of rules
concerning the Dodd–Frank Act whistleblower program.177 This Comment
highlights many problems of the Dodd–Frank Act’s whistleblower
provisions and their impact on the FCPA, which ought to be considered as
the Whistleblower Office shapes the evolution of whistleblower-assisted
law enforcement of the FCPA.
The changes proposed in this Comment do not lessen the importance
or effectiveness of the FCPA’s mission to tackle corruption. Instead, the
proposals constitute ways to rein in the FCPA so that it does not become a
profit-generating sword of the government that unreasonably restrains U.S.
business. These changes will make companies more likely to litigate
allegations, thereby allowing our adversarial system to test the validity and
strength of FCPA claims and whistleblower accusations. Further, these
174
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changes will allow FCPA cases to benefit from judicial review and will
build precedent upon which companies can rely. Additionally, a natural
consequence of litigating FCPA charges will be to bring to light frivolous
or false whistleblower claims, with a possible deterrent effect upon
similarly inclined whistleblowers. Since these proposed changes would
result in greater transparency and less fear of litigation on behalf of targeted
companies, the changes would likely enhance companies’ compliance and
self-reporting. These proposed amendments would allow the Dodd–Frank
Act’s goals to be achieved but would make the FCPA less of a monster.

